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God’s government of the world was of special importance for the Dutch in the second half of 
their War of Liberation from the Papist Oppressors from Spain. Across the board they were 
convinced that God had delivered them from the Spanish tyranny, and they were afraid to 
forsake God’s benevolence by sinning. Also here, these Dutch Reformed parted company 
with each other. Some were going to maintain that God had decided upon who will be saved 
and who won’t, in his unfathomable and eternal Edict. Although God thereby is presented as 
the Author of evil, this is so in an indirect way only, viz. by way of punishment of the sins of 
the unbelievers, the heterodox and heretics, the schismatics and apostates. ‘Evil is the rod of 
His wrath’, in the in no way original words of Johannes Trigland.1 Others in the Reformed 
Church maintained – and they considered this to be the original Christian position – the 
general nature of man’s justification by Christ’s sufferance on the cross. Therefore, the latter 
were in need of a different understanding of evil in the world. To consider sinful man, in the 
injudicious use of his free will, to be himself the author of evil seemed the obvious choice, 
however, creating the need for an appropriate notion of redemption that unveils the causal 
nexus between Christ’s sufferance and justification. The Socinians believed they had found 
the logical thing to say: there is no way in which Christ’s passion can be proportional to 
man’s sins, while it is absurd to suppose that Christ (the innocent Lamb) might have been 
punished for our sins. Hence man’s justification must have followed from God’s free and 
unmerited liberation from punishment. Hereby, however, the person of Christ was greatly 
reduced in importance, a process to be brought to its logical conclusion by denying Christ to 
be an independent persona of God. When Sybrandus Lubbertus started to attack Socinianism 
in the Low Countries, in the first decade of the seventeenth century, there was as yet no such a 
Socinian position at hand. His attacks went accompanied by a full exposition of the Socinian 
doctrine in the form of his Franeker edition of Socinus’ own De Iesu Christo servatore in 
1611.2 While we may surmise that his anti-Socinian project was maybe to counter early 
developments towards rational Christianity, or maybe because he considered it to be a more 
radical version of the Arminian threat, in any case, Lubbertus was well served by the 
attempted appointment of the (not so cryptic) Socinian from Steinfurt (Germany), Conradus 
Vorstius, to Arminius’ chair. It is there that the momentous debates of the 1610s started. 
Grotius stepped in with his Ordinum pietas of 1613 and he contributed a few years later with 
the De satisfactione Christi (1617) in which he attacked Faustus Socinus himself on the 
subject of man’s justification by Christ. 
 
In this article I will discuss the position of this anti-Socinian tract of Grotius within the 
context of his early writings, as well as its reception. In due course it will become evident that 
the opinion of the modern3 editor of this text that De satisfactione is essential a work in 
theology is misguided. Not only does Grotius take issue with the deeper dimensions of Dutch 
                                                 
1 Triglandius 1616, Aenwysinge, pp. 31 ff. 
2 Cf. Rabbie 1990, Introduction, pp. 7 ff, where he refers to the visit of the Polish Socinians Christoph Ostorodt 
and Andrezj Woidowski to Franeker in 1598, and argues the general absence of knowledge of and interest in 
Socinus in the early seventeenth century Netherlands. Apparently Lubbertus had to create such an interest (by his 
edition) before he could fight it. The story was first mentioned by Jac Taurinus 1611 in his Brand-
clock, directed against the Frisian opponents of Conradus Vorstius. 
3 Actually, Gerardus Vossius had been its contemporary editor. See infra. 
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theological politics, but also we do find here the origins of that radical Grotian politics that 
one is now wont to identify with radical Enlightenment. In a restricted sense the issue at hand 
is that of the nature of punishment. However, as punishment presupposes a theory of justice, 
in a concealed way if one likes, the whole debate on predestination is on the table. Grotius 
conceals and feigns to discuss only matters of abstruse theological nature. Having fought the 
predestinarians for many years, in collaboration with Johannes Wtenbogaert whose history of 
religious appeasement goes back to the great debates of the 1590s, Grotius had no problem in 
understanding their zeal and aim. By fearing God’s wrath if soft on heresy, these True 
Reformed made the fight against heresy a reason of state. Even while the conscience of 
individual man should not be forced (and here the Dutch Reformed agreed across the board) 
we should not easily forsake God’s benevolence by not fighting heresy. Grotius sets out to 
undermine this conception of the private-public distinction which makes belief a public affair, 
and would give a spectacular meaning to the very conception of the ‘public church’.4
 
The late eighteenth-century Dutch philosopher and theologian Dionysius van den Wijnpersse 
is being reported to have remarked that Grotius treats punishment differently in De 
satisfactione Christi and De jure belli et pacis (DJB&P).5 The context of that remark is a 
discussion between the Leiden literati Meinardus Tydeman and Willem Bilderdijk on the 
nature of grace, the principles of Protestantism, natural theology and natural law. Tydeman 
wrote to Bilderdijk: “D. van den Wijnpersse praised the anti-Socinian book of Grotius De 
Satisfactione.” 
The two correspondents – Orangists, Calvinists, and conservatist – shared a disapproving 
attitude towards the Arminian-Loevesteinian-Aristocrat writers ‘who were more successful in 
their literary activities than in politics’. It did not deter them from receiving Grotius as one of 
their own in the fight against the English Unitarians that was so important in the Dutch 
Christian Enlightenment at the end of the eighteenth century. Dionysius van den Wijnpersse 
had been involved in the Haagsche Genootschap for the defence of the faith against Priestley 
and his Unitarian influence in the Netherlands in the 1780s. And indeed, while in the 
seventeenth century Grotius was generally believed to be a Socinian himself, and suspected of 
a hidden political agenda, the eighteenth-century attitude towards Grotius seems to be 
primarily a positive one, against the background of a general ‘Dutch’ understanding of natural 
law. The interest of these intellectuals – defining their relationship to the endeavours of the 
Dutch Republic that no longer was – is apparently the interface between theology and natural 
law, more precisely the concordance between a theological and a natural-law conception of 
punishment. Correctly, they understand that Hugo Grotius was precisely engaged in a similar 
                                                 
4 There is a straight development from the Coornhert debates in the 1580s to the Arminianism debates in the 
1600s. The history of church politics Kerckelycke geschiedenissen (Leiden 1650) by Jacobus Trigland is very 
informative for these debates, in particular with a view to determining within these decates the interconnection of 
the various processes of transformation in Dutch society around 1600: religious establishment, economic growth 
and social change, in a new political order. 
5 Bilderdijk, Tydeman, Tydeman 1866, Briefwisseling, vol. I, p. 55,  MT to WB (25 March 1808): “D. v.d. 
Wijnpersse prees het Anti-Sociniaansch boek van Grotius de Satisfactione; maar verwonderde zich, dat hij, 
daarin, een ander denkbeeld van de straf voorstelde, dan in zijn Jus Belli ac Pacis, en eene andere, en betere, 
verklaring van Jesai. 53, dan in zijn Comment. ad ill. loc., daar hij ’t op Jeremias past.” Cf. van de Wijnpersse 
1778, Verhandeling; van de Wynpersse 1794, Demonstration [= Translation of van der Wynpersee 1793, 
Betoog]. Dionysius van den(?) Wynpersse (1724-1808) was a professor of philosophy in Leiden. For the Jesaia 
reference see: De satisfactione X, 38: “consider that part of the covenant in which Christ stipulated that, if he 
submitted to death, it would happen that to those who believed in him remission for sins would be granted, and 
God made this promise, as appears from Esai. 53.10”. Cf. Grotius 1679, Annotationes in VT, p. 323b, ll. 16 ff. 
The correspondents owned a negative appreciation of Pufendorf, and estimated the Leiden natural law thinker 
Pestel above Immanuel Kant, as transpires from the same correspondence. 
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enterprise, and the remark of van den Wijnpersse on an apparent inconsistency between the 
two in Grotius is telling. No surprise he studied Grotius, and came to his observation. 
 
Van de Wijnpersse was referring here to an overlooked aspect of Grotius’ theory of 
punishment that is particularly relevant from a theological perspective: is God acting for a 
purpose when he punishes or is he punishing for his own sake? If for a purpose then God’s 
punishment is on a par with that of other rulers: punishment is undertaken for the sake of 
justice. If not, then a problem arises in the theory of satisfaction.  
 
It has been remarked that Socinianism has much in common with Arminianism, in particular a 
rationalist approach to the Bible, an emphasis on the practical moral value of religion and an 
abhorrence of theoretical subtleties.6 Rationalism in theology is about method rather than 
substance and in the issues at hand, the nature of God’s saving grace, Arminianism was 
mostly concerned with the election to and resistibility of grace, while Socinus concentrated on 
grace as the completely free gift of God. Grotius had become involved in these issues along 
both fronts. Not only within the context of the Remonstrant-Counterremonstrant debates on 
predestination, but also on the Socinian-Calvinist front, as a consequence of the alleged 
Socinianism of Conradus Vorstius (1569-1622) appointed to the chair of Arminius in Leiden.7 
Grotius’ Pietas (1613) – an outright defence of the Remonstrance and toleration – was 
occasioned by what finally would turn out to be an insurmountable opposition against 
Vorstius’ appointment.8 A few years later, he wrote his Defensio fidei catholicae de 
satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem (1617) to deal with the question of 
the nature of sin and its redemption. By singling out this issue, he skilfully combines a 
critique of Socinianism with a defence of his own Remonstrant position, without however 
being forced to tread into the well-worn paths of the arguments ‘de gratia et praedestinatione’. 
[well-worn, as exemplified e.g. by the summarizing treatments by Polyander and 
Grevinchovius 9] And then, when Grotius writes his De veritate religionis Christianae, 
published in 1627 after some delay, he again returns to Vorstius by taking Vorstius’ 
anonymous edition of Socinus’ book on bible interpretation as the basis of its third and fourth 
chapters. The De Satisfactione hence is in between the Ordinum pietas of 1613 and the De 
veritate of 1627, all of which taken together with some justification made him liable to the 
suspicion of Socinianism as well as political schemes. As the argument went, Grotius was 
coming to the rescue of Socinianism because he did not explicitly condemn its central tenets, 
and hence tacitly condoned it. 
 
There is another lineage, however. That one follows the road of the notion of punishment, 
from De jure praedae commentarius, written between 1604 and 1607, to De satisfactione and 
to the book mentioned in reference by Van de Wynpersse, De jure belli ac pacis, published in 
Paris in 1625. This lineage spans a slightly larger period, but it is a lineage by hindsight 
because De jure praedae remained a manuscript till 1864 when it was rediscovered to be 
published in 1868 by H.G. Hamaker on the instigation of Robert Fruin. Punishment plays a 
complicated role in the Grotian oeuvre. We will see punishment’s importance in the theory of 
just war (no surprise, evidently), and in the understanding of the doctrine of redemption (a bit 
                                                 
6 Cf. Kühler 1912, Socianisme. 
7 See his justification before the Senate of Heidelberg in 1599: Vorstius 1611, Confessio.. 
8 The attack was led by Sybrandus Lubbertus, a Calvinist minister from Leeuwarden (Frisia), who had made the 
persecution of Socinianism his pet project. First he edited a Socinian text, then he orchestrated the attack on 
Vorstius’ appointment, see Lubbertus 1611, Iesu, and Lubbertus 1613, Commentarii. From there, Socinianism 
quickly became the kind of contagation that was actively shunned notwithstanding the famous Dutch toleration 
that made the publication of Socinian writings plainly possible. 
9 Polyander à Kerckhoven 1616,  Staet. 
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more of a surprise), and, lastly, in the construction of man’s sociability. To reduce this to one 
phrase: punishment is the linchpin of the bringing about of justice, as in just war, justification, 
and social justice. It remains to be seen what this second lineage for the De satisfactione has 
to do with Faustus Socinus, as that requires us to understand the interdependencies of the 
second lineage, from De jure praedae to De jure belli ac pacis.10
 
At issue in this development ultimately is the reordering of reason and revelation, a process 
which takes place against the Calvinists’ history of salvation, and against the dogmatic 
conception of justice. The nature of God’s justice being at stake, the humanist demands a 
coherent view of the world including both divine and human justice under one simple 
concept. The long discourses on punishment are therefore to be seen as the disquisition of the 
practical side of justice (punishment is the essence of the execution of justice, which is 
nothing else but the bringing about of a situation of justice (‘justice done’). De veritate is 
about the reasonableness of Christianity, it is apologetic, and in a way all of Grotius’ 
Christianity is apologetic: he believes that revelation brings certainty (assensus) to truth, 
established by way of consensus among men. Compare this with J. Trigland, in his acerbic 
criticism of Arminianism, as he derides the interest in political order among the ‘politijcken’, 
praising the trust in God’s eternal plan of the ‘kerkelijcken’. “But since they have no certainty 
in religion, or more correctly don’t have a religion at all (Omnis Religio nulla religio, All 
Religion is no religion), they expect their salvation from a civil life, and thus aim to dissolve 
other people’s hearts from the creed, put on quicksand and make rely on a political life.”11 
The Calvinists (or: ‘Gereformeerden’, Reformed, as they preferred to be called) emphasised 
the undeserved aspect of grace: God’s grace is not a consequence of man’s belief, but belief is 
rather a consequence of grace. Where the Socinians agree with them in seeing grace as 
undeserved (free gift of God) the deviation must be fought to deny the relevance of Christ’s 
passion. 
 
We must therefore first analyse what is meant by the biblical ‘Christ died for our sins’, and 
Grotius’ answer is that man is punished for his sins because Christ, the son of God, has freely 
accepted to be punished in our place by the greatest punishment of all, i.e. death. In order to 
defend this interpretation, Grotius develops a notion of punishment, which is essentially that 
the final cause of punishment is the prevention of sin, and the promotion of justice. In this 
way, Grotius expounds the practical moral value of the Bible and the central place in it of the 
coming of Christ, while preventing the dismal conclusion that God is the author of sin or evil, 
and underlining the importance of human freedom. 
 
No doubt, ever since Grotius had started writing on just war, he had stressed the importance 
of punishment for the establishment of justice. The argument in De jure praedae is 
straightforward. In what must be regarded as a classical oikeiosis-argument, Grotius states 
that man’s first duty is to himself, and that self-preservation and appropriation of goods are 
precepts of the law of nature. But there is also the perspective of ‘universal concord’, and the 
typical challenge of oikeiosis as we find it e.g. in Cicero is to understand the process by which 
this universal concord and humanity comes about. This ‘justice properly so called’, to ‘have a 
                                                 
10 Among the earlier literature on Grotius attention is paid to the doctrine of punishment by Haggenmacher 1984, 
Grotius;, see also Besselink 1989, Faith. On the relationship between Grotius and later philosophy of penal law, 
see Hüning 2000, Potestas. 
11 Trigland 1615, Christen: “Maer alsoo sy selfs gheen vasticheyt inde religie/ Ja om recht te seggen gheen 
religie hebbende (want Omnis Religio nulla religio, Alle Religie is gheen religie) haer salicheydt stellen in een 
Borgherlijck leven/ soo soecken sy oock ander menschen herten met haer vande Religie los te maecken/ op een 
drif-sant setten/ ende op een polityck leven te doen vertrouwen.” 
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care for the welfare of others’, ‘that brotherhood of man’, that ‘certain kinship established 
among us by nature’ makes it ‘sinful that man should lie in ambush for his fellow man, a 
precept which Cicero very properly ascribes to the law of nations’. 
 
The foregoing observations show how erroneously the Academics – those masters of 
ignorance – have argued in refutation of justice, that the kind derived from nature 
looks solely to personal advantage, while civil justice is based not upon nature but 
merely upon opinion; for they have overlooked that intermediate aspect of justice 
which is characteristic of humankind.12
In addition to the law of self-preservation and the law of acquisition thus arise the law of 
inoffensiveness and the law of abstinence. ‘Consequently, we feel the need of that form of 
justice properly known as ¢ret¾ koinwnik», or ‘social virtue’ (virtus socialis).’ 13 In 
passing we should mention that Grotius considers his first law to follow from necessity. ‘As 
we read in Seneca, necessity, which breaks all law, is a great support of this great human 
weakness. Indeed necessity is the first law of nature, as we said in the beginning.’ 
 
Of the two forms of justice then distinguished, compensatory justice (justitia compensatrix) 
has a twofold function: in regard to good, the preservation thereof; in regard to evil, its 
correction. The law of obligation deals with these matters, but also that of reward and 
punishment. It may well be asked why two approaches to compensatory justice are proposed. 
If indeed the subjective rights to life, liberty, and estate in a social setting imply the 
corresponding duty to respect those of others, it might seem that obligation would be 
sufficient. Grotius notices that obligations can arise from contract and from offence 
(delictum), and that obligations have to be fulfilled.  
 
‘Such justice requires that the thing taken shall be returned in the case of a theft just as 
in the case of a loan, and that, even as payment is made of a purchase price or of a 
revenue from a contract, so also reparation for loss inflicted and restitution for injuries 
should be provided.’  
 
Thus one may ask, if a wrongdoer incurs an obligation to be fulfilled, why should a 
wrongdoer in addition be punished? Indeed, to inflict punishment upon a person is to harm 
him, which seems to run counter to the laws of nature developed so far. In other words, if the 
‘equality’ of the subjective rights is all that is at stake in society, it must be sufficient to have 
a concept of obligation and its fulfilment. Naturally, the issue arises how people are made to 
perform their obligations, and its regulation being the interest of all would have to be allotted 
to magistrates. From this perspective Grotius maintains that evil has to be punished, just as 
good deeds have to be rewarded. The reason for this is that punishment and reward do not 
pertain to the fulfilment of a debt incurred, but to prevent evil and promote good deeds. 
Punishment is a ‘curative procedure’, and also functions by example – as says Aristotle; 
punishment is not imposed ‘because sin has been committed but in order that its commission 
may be prevented’ (Plato).  However, we still fail to have a straightforward connection 
between the argument of rights and duties on the one hand and that of reward-punishment.  
 
Grotius in fact is using two kinds of argument to defend punishment. Both are part of a 
possible oikeiosis process.14 On the one hand, he follows the well-established republican 
                                                 
12 Grotius, ___, DJP, II [6’, 7]. 
13 Grotius, ___, DJP, II [8]. 
14 See on oikeiosis in Grotius Winkel 1988, oikeosis-Lehre and Blom and Winkel (forthcoming), Grotius and the 
Stoa.  
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argument for public virtue. From the classical Pericles exhortation, Platonist arguments that 
the whole is crucial to the parts, and Livius’ statement that ‘in no way will you be able to 
protect your own interests by betraying the public interest’, it is followed that in addition to 
the rights and duties between individuals, the individual has duties towards the community to 
which a right of the community corresponds. This right takes the form of punishment because  
 
‘owing to the fact that men (repeatedly carried away not by true self-love but by a 
false and inordinate form of that sentiment [non vero sed falso atque inordinate sui 
amore], the root of all evil) were mistaking for equality that which was in point of fact 
disproportionate ownership, and because this false conception was giving rise to 
dissension and tumult, evils which it was important to avoid for the sake of concord 
and public tranquillity, the state (respublica) intervened in the role of arbiter (mediā) 
among the contending parties, and divided the various portions equitably’.15
 
Here Grotius explains that the republic contributes to the establishment of justice by 
rewarding/punishing according to the distinction between ‘verum / falsum sui amor’. This 
move is part of the ascending order that leads to universal concord and humanity. Although 
Grotius emphasises in the next line that the origin of these judgements (judicia) of the 
republic is the same as the origin of laws (and that consequently all authority is by consent 
only), the theory of punishment is made coextensive with the republic: its role is to rule out 
‘amor propre’ and promote ‘amour de soi’. That is to say that the republic must impose upon 
the citizens a moral attitude towards the enjoyments of one’s rights coherent with some higher 
good, the preservation of the commonwealth itself. Indeed, within the oikeiosis perspective, 
one would require an order expanding from self-preservation to commonwealth and finally to 
universal humanity and concord.16  
 
We find an indication of how to understand this process in Grotius’ discussion of the moral 
vengeance that the first two laws – of self-preservation and appropriation – have in the offing. 
In the passage that Richard Tuck presents as his core exhibit for an Epicurean interpretation 
of Grotius, that God created man HQ⌧P, ‘free and sui juris’, I 
understand Grotius – in contradistinction to Tuck – to indicate a first step in the process 
towards social justice.17 That is, precisely from man’s freedom he deduces the ‘fidei regula’, 
the rule of good faith, truth and trustworthiness. Being true to one’s own free self, man is 
morally bound to be true to others. Lying and cheating thus become actions of a different 
category than incurring a debt, even while normally as a consequence these actions do create 
debts in their trail. Hence, when good faith develops, Cicero is right in calling it ‘the 
foundation of justice’, says Grotius. Failing the rule of good faith is thus the kind of evil that 
deserves punishment.18
                                                 
15 Grotius, ___, DJP, II [11’]. 
16 This argument is developed by Grotius in close reference to Cicero, De finibus, III, and Seneca, De beneficiis, 
V. 
17 Trigland mentions that the term aÙtoxoÚsion is discussed by Augustine, Twee brieven tegen de Pelagianen, 
bk 3, c. 4; c. 9. I did not find this publication. Presumably Trigland refers here to Bode, met twee seyndt-brieven, 
Prosperi e¯n Hilarii, aen Avgvstinvm; van de over-blijfselen vande ketterije der pelagianen. Rotterdam 1608: 
Waesberghe (Tr. from the Latin into Dutch and ann. by A.J. Smout). See for the argument Trigland 1650, 
Geschiedenissen, pp. 17ff. 
18 The term regula is used in the Digests to indicate general principles of law, in distinction to specific rulings. In 
Roman oratory, regulae are the principles inherent in language and language use. E.g. in Quintillian, Inst Orat 
X,2,13; Seneca, Ben, 4,12. Reference to Cicero, Off, I, 23: “Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est 
dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen 
audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat, quod dictum est 
appellatam fidem.” Cf. also Fikentscher 1979, Fide. 
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Thus we have to distinguish two ways of introducing just punishment: one on the basis of the 
priority of the commonwealth over ‘amour propre’, and another on the basis of the moral 
value of faithfulness. The former entails what nowadays is called, end-state principles, the 
latter is a procedural principle. Oikeiosis demands of man to be in harmony with nature, i.e. 
with the larger whole of which he forms part. Oikeiosis starts from the awareness of self and 
the interests of self, and shows the ways in which the individual is re-connected (in the sense 
of ‘re-ligio’) to the totality of nature, either by accepting laws (civil law, law of nations, 
God’s law), or by developing behaviour that will produce this harmony (fides).19 The 
prevention of unjust actions can be done by demonstrating that the transgression of laws will 
not be permitted (i.e. be punished), or by punishing breaches of fides. The former is about the 
subjection to laws, while the latter is about the establishment of laws, in communities of 
faithfulness. From the former perspective punishment is the prerogative of authority, from the 
latter perspective punishment is everyone’s business. 
 
It is my contention in this paper that while Grotius combined both perspectives in De Jure 
Praedae (DJP) (for obvious reasons, since he wanted to allow the right of punishment to 
individuals in the absence of authority (i.e. enforcing the law of nations by default), as well as 
for reason of breach of contract (everyone has the right to punish unfaithfulness, even if not 
part of the contract)). Next, he emphasised the first approach in De satisfactione Christi, and 
the second one in DJB&P. I will now present these two in historical order.  
 
1. Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum 
Senensem 
 
In 1617 was published Grotius’s De satisfactione Christi, a defence of the ‘catholic’ creed 
against Faustus Socinus from Siena. It has been convincingly argued that Grotius, with the 
intellectual support of his friends, and in particular that of Gerardus Vossius, set out to write 
this critique of Socinian ideas about atonement as an attempt to counter the animosity he had 
earned among Counter-Remonstrants with his defence of the Remonstrant minister Conradus 
Vorstius in his Pietas of 1613. Grotius expected that a critique of Socinianism on an issue far 
away from contested concepts like predestination and free will would re-establish his 
orthodoxy, and hence his credibility as a political leader and leading intellectual. How wrong 
he was! 
 
As Hermannus Ravensperger, the author of a small tract against the Satisfactione remarked:20  
“I am wholly convinced that under the pretext of religion the cause of a region [viz. Holland] 
is being promoted; that a political schism is sought by means of a religious one; that under the 
cover of the five articles [the so-called five fundamental articles of faith of the Remonstrants] 
are hidden the monsters of errors and the idols of a Socinian brain” 
And to sum up: “I have noticed that he [Grotius] refutes ‘Socinus’s opinion’ on satisfaction 
and snatches the arms taken from jurisprudence, from the adversary of the catholic faith in 
such a way that time and again he comes to the assistance of that same adversary”. In other 
words, says Ravensperger, Grotius is not only using a pretended refutation of Socinus as a 
stealthy means to political ends, but even devilishly promotes Socinianism itself. 
                                                 
19 Spinoza will take fides as the core concept in the ‘contract’-chapter – chapter 16 – (Spinoza 1670, Tractatus), 
although he wants to underline that fides is still purely utilitarian as people (rulers and citizens alike) are shamed 
into fides. A comparison between Grotius and Spinoza on this score is highly illuminative of both thinkers, but is 
to be presented elsewhere. 
20 Quoted in Rabbie 1990, Introduction, pp. 43. 
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A few years later the German Socinian Johannes Crellius replied to Grotius. Although pressed 
to do so, Grotius did not answer this book, arguing that by responding he would as a matter of 
fact promote the case of Socinianism rather than defy it. Apparently he had learnt his lesson. 
However, that was not the end of it. Within a few years, the whole affair fired back upon 
Grotius who was in the end generally regarded by his Counterremonstrant opponents to be a 
real Socinian himself. “What happened to Mr. Grotius is the same as what happened to all 
Remonstrants: … as long as they had hope to retain the town hall and the church they showed 
Christian countenance, but when those were lost, they lost at the same moment the divine 
truth and conscience”, writes the devoted Voetian spokesman Martinus Schoockius in 1638.21
 
De satisfactione essentially sets out its case along the following lines: 
- Punishment is not an act which falls within the competence of the offended party as 
such (II, 5).22 
- The offended party has no right to punishment (II, 8), but only restitution (II, 9) [the 
cause of debt is not the moral wrongness of the act, but that I lack something, II, 10] 
- The right of punishment in the ruler is neither the right of absolute ownership nor a 
personal right (II, 16) 
 
Therefore, and as a consequence, Christ’s redemption of our sins is a ‘dispensation’, i.e. ‘an 
act by a superior, by which the obligation imposed by a law remaining in force is removed 
with regard to certain persons or things’ (III, 2). Punishment is not necessarily proportional to 
the sin (III, 10). Socinus’ claim that ‘no one can take upon himself the punishment for the 
delict of another’ is countered by Grotius, by showing examples of the opposite. (IV, 21) This 
is clearly sufficient for his purpose, which apparently is to further stress that punishment is 
not based on a contractual relation, nor on a creditor-debtor relation: ‘but the real question is 
this, whether an act which is within the power of a superior can, even without consideration of 
another’s delict, be appointed by the superior for the punishment of another’s crime’. (IV, 
22)’ 
For punishment, therefore to be just, it is required that the act of punishing itself is 
within the power of him who punishes, which holds true in three cases, either by the 
previous right of him who punishes, or by the just and valid consent of him whose 
punishment is concerned, or by a delict of the same’ (IV, 12). There must be a certain 
connection between him who has sinned and him who is to be punished: ‘This 
connection, then, is either natural, as between father and son, or mystical, as between 
king and people, or voluntary, as between defendant and surety’ (IV, 11) 
And in further proof Grotius adduces some telling examples: 
‘who would regard as unjust the decimation usual in the Roman legions … ? Who 
would regard it as unjust, if, when the highest power relaxes the law, some man who is 
useful to the state but deserving of exile because he is guilty of some crime is retained 
in the state while someone else of his own free will takes upon himself the obligation 
to go into exile, in order to furnish the required example? Who would regard it as 
unjust, if the highest ruler of the state refuses public offices, for the fulfilment of 
which others equally competent are found, to children of public enemies, even though 
they are not otherwise unworthy? Indeed, there is nothing unjust in this. For in the first 
case the crime of him who is punished, in the second case the valid consent of him 
whose case is concerned, and in the third the liberty of the ruler, permitted the 
occurrence of the thing which the ruler used as punishment’. (IV, 22) 
                                                 
21 Quoted in Rabbie 1990, Introduction, pp. 47. 
22 References are to the chapter and paragraph numbering of the Rabbie edition. 
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The conclusion, in the next paragraph, is that God used the ‘sufferings and death of Christ in 
order to set a serious example against the immense guilt of us all’. Clearly, just as the ancients 
said about forgiveness that it was ‘neither according to the law, nor against the law, but above 
the law and for the law’, this is completely true of his divine grace. It is above the law, 
because we are not punished; it is for the law, because the punishment is not omitted, and 
remission is granted in order that we may in the future live according to the divine law’ (V, 
11). A precise discussion of the distinction between debtor-creditor and sinner-punisher 
relationships then follows, in particular as it appears in the procedures of the discharge of debt 
and punishment. Thus Grotius is going to achieve his threefold refutation of Socinus, i.e. 
‘Now that two questions have been answered, whether God could justly punish the willing 
Christ for our sins, and whether there was some sufficient cause for God to do so, a third 
remains, whether God did this in reality, or, what amounts to the same thing, whether he 
intended to do so’ (VI, 1). 
 
The real issue of De satisfactione thus has become whether God has done justice to man by 
promising redemption of the sins. In De jure praedae the question was whether certain 
actions of punishment were just (war, the taking of prise or booty), in De satisfactione the 
question is whether full justice has been done by a certain (limited) act of punishment. In 
order to answer this question, (again) the theory of punishment has to be elaborated in relation 
to justice. 
 
Grotius definitely had reasons of a theological nature to construct this theory. On the one 
hand, he was bound by the opinions of Socinus he was refuting. In this respect he had to take 
issue with various publicly decried Socinian positions, such as on the nature of God. Other 
matters relate to God’s will and power in relation to the law. The integration between 
theological and legal arguments is achieved by describing God as a king in the execution of 
justice. Hence the series of metaphorical names: superior, princeps, rector. The conception of 
punishment itself is the same as in DJP, the right to punish is limited to ‘superiors’ only. It is 
remarkable that so to say the sole responsibility for the rectification of injustice is in the hands 
of superiors. It is also remarkable that the notion of sin is not elaborated upon. Good reasons 
for this may be found in the Ordinum pietas, where Grotius claimed the freedom of 
prophesising, and derides the claims to exclusivity on the part of the ministers of the 
Orthodox Church. No doubt, God gives the last judgement, and original sin is not to be 
disputed (even while it does not figure in the five fundamental articles of the Remonstrants). 
Moreover, a discussion of the contents of sin was irrelevant to the Socianian refutation, so not 
even the question how we know God’s justice was at stake. 
 
2. De poenis 
 
In chapter xx of book II of De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius retakes his whole discussion of 
punishment. The exposition is much more extensive, various authors are presented in a new 
light, and the tenor of the argument is different. As the exposition in De jure praedae was in 
chapter II, which was not published until 1868, his readers will not have remarked any 
chances, except when putting the De satisfactione next to it. This was noted by Van den 
Wynpersse at the end of the eighteenth century, preceded in the seventeenth century only by 
Lambertus van Velthuysen, theologian and lawyer, and in the continuing anti-Socinian 
climate drawn to reconsider Grotius’ book. 
 
Thus, in paragraph iii.1 of DJB&P II.xx, Grotius explained: 
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But the subject of this right (of punishment), that is, he to whom the right is due, has 
not been determined by nature itself. She indicates indeed the reason why a wrongdoer 
can be punished, not, however, who should punish, even though she indicates 
sufficiently that it is most convenient to nature if this is undertaken by him who is 
superior. Not, however, because this is proven to be necessarily so, except in so far as 
the word ‘superior’ is taken in that sense that he who acts wrongly thereby is seen to 
make himself inferior to any other and lowers himself from the ranks of man into that 
of the animals. 
The competence to this right belongs by nature to everybody, … even while in the 
republic one must understand these to be indicated by the laws. (ix, 2)23
 
Grotius thus gives a somewhat unusual interpretation to the dictum ‘he who is without sins, 
let him cast the first stone’, by indeed presupposing the moral rectitude of he who punishes 
him who is punished. Moreover, the purpose of punishment - as we have seen before - in the 
words of Seneca: Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. This implies a 
certain lenitude in punishment, as indeed we find among men, ‘because man is to such an 
extent bound to another by bounds of blood, that he must not hurt him unless for the purpose 
of some further good. In God it is a different matter.’ (iv,2) 
 
For the actions of God can be based upon the right of the Supreme Power (ipso summi 
dominii iure), particularly where a man’s special desert is concerned, even if they have 
in view no end outside themselves. … That is, even then when He punishes a wicked 
man, He does so with no other purpose than of punishing him. 
Nevertheless, even if we follow the more generally accepted interpretation it comes to 
the same thing, so that God is said to have made all things for His own sake, that by 
right of the highest freedom, not seeking or regarding any perfection outside Himself; 
just as God is said to be ‘self-existent’ (aÙtofu¾j) because He is not born of any. 
Assuredly, Holy Writ bears witness that the punishments of those that are irretrievably 
lost are not exacted by God for any purpose, when it is said that He derives pleasure 
from their woe, and that the impious are derided and mocked by God.24
 
Human punishment, on the other hand is not dependent on any other notion of superiority 
than that of moral superiority. Moreover, human punishment is for a goal. This differs from 
both the argument in De jure praedae and in De satisfactione. In a double sense Grotius has 
been changing his position.  
1. Any honest man can punish an evil, with the purpose of preventing further evil, correcting 
the wrongdoer, or putting an example.  
2. Moreover, even after judges have been appointed to whom the power to punish has been 
allotted, the old natural liberty remains, especially in places where there are no courts, as, for 
example, on the sea. In this respect, all reference to the ranks and order of society is lost.  
 
3. The inconsistency explained 
 
Against the background of two strands of thought in Grotius: a theological one from the 
Ordinum Pietas to De veritate; and a development in his theory of justice from De aequitate 
to DJB&P. After a period of fruitfully combining the theological and legal-political 
perspectives, Grotius is seen to separate these again. God’s teaching of justice now has 
                                                 
23 Grotius, 1993, DJB&P, II, 20, iii. 
24 Grotius, 1993, DJB&P, II, 20, iv.. 
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become independent from his control of the world. It is here that the difference between De 
satisfactione and DJB&P comes to the fore. This difference consequently has to do with the 
relationship between divine justice and human justice. Two moves are made. On the one 
hand, the purpose of punishment in human affairs is even more clearly defined as justice and 
the punishment is available to all righteous persons, that is, no longer is maintained that 
punishment is only available to rulers. On the other hand, the similarity between God the ruler 
and human rulers has been severed. God does not punish for a purpose. Here Grotius is 
apparently tempted to follow ‘the more generally accepted’ interpretation, i.e. – I would argue 
– more generally accepted than the interpretation he gave in De satisfactione. 
 
Grotius’ concept of justice is the connecting thread between DJP, De satisfactione and 
DJB&P. In the process, the theory of punishment is secularised, by relegating Christ’s 
redemption to the mysteries of God again. The responsibility in punishment, furthermore, is 
emphasised, in order to stress the frailty of human life. Punishment is a judgement about 
circumstances and consequences, rather than a command, or the application of power. This is 
underwritten by the Gospel. 
 
We have seen how Grotius developed his theory of justice around the idea of just punishment. 
He was therefore definitely not inclined to accept Socinus’ interpretation of man’s 
justification through Christ, as it hinged on omitting punishment, rather than its execution. 
Like Socinus, however, Grotius strongly believed in the coherence of reason and revelation, 
even while many subtleties of Scripture must necessarily escape us. The continuity of natural 
religion, natural theology, and revelation is what Grotius shared with Socinus, rather than 
anything like Unitarianism. The Socinian emphasis on religion as a help for the practical 
conduct of life is reflected in Grotius as well. In his zeal, however, to reject Socinus, Grotius 
identified divine and human punishment as the right of the sovereign for the promotion of the 
common good. This position did not satisfy him in the end. Not only did he defy from 
answering Crellius, but he retracted his steps in the De jure belli ac pacis. The development 
from just war to justification and from there to justice implied in the end a more radical 
opposition to Socinus: the justice obtainable among men is the result of the human capacity of 
self-justification. Thereby Grotius prepared the way for the Enlightenment. This significant 
change was recognised at the end of the eighteenth century, and at the same time earned 




The first defence of the Satisfactione against Crellius25 will only appear in 1648, when 
Lambertus van Velthuysen writes his Specimen refutationis libri Crellii de satisfactione 
Christi. There is no evidence why Velthuysen (1622-1685) undertook to write this book. He 
was trained as a minister and doctor in the late 1630s and 1640s, in Utrecht and Leiden. His 
attempts to obtain a minister’s position failed on the accusation of unorthodoxy. It might seem 
that he wanted, as Grotius had, to rehabilitate himself. However, in the dedication of the book 
to Johannes Jacobus du Bois, minister of the Walloon Church in Utrecht, he expresses his 
                                                 
25 Actually, Antwoord van Joannes Krellius Frankus [...] op het boek van Hugo de Groot aangaande de 
genoegdoening van Christus tegen Faustus Socinus van Sena geschreeven (S.l.: s.n., 1623) is the Dutch 
translation of Johannes Crellius’ Ad librum Hugonis Grotii quem de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum 
Socinum Senensem scripsit responsio (Rakow, 1623). A year after Velthuysen’s critique, a Dutch translation of 
Crellius’ defence of religious freedom was to be published: Verdediginge vande vryheyt der religie. Door 
Joannis Crellius Polack. In 't Latijn beschreven en uytghegheven in 't jaer 1637. En nu in 't Nederlandtsch 
getrouwelijck overgheset. s.l.: s.t. 1649. 
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gratitude to belong to this church.26 A refuge this was no doubt, since all of his family had 
been and remained members of the Dutch Reformed Church. In what would become his usual 
style, Velthuysen emphasises that his only aim in writing the book is to find out the truth 
about the matter: no polemics. Apart from Crellius (and his stand-in Martinus Ruarus), we 
find only a reference to unnamed adversarii of his position. Only one other name appears 
explicitly: that of the Clarissimus Grotius, as the author of the Satisfactione of 1617. And 
indeed, the general line of the argument is in many respects based on Grotius’s exposition. 
However, Velthuysen had also read De Cive at that point in time. In his reconstruction of the 
juridical analysis of punishment, which was one of the important elements in Grotius’s 
contribution, he brings up the Hobbesian formula that according to pristine law (‘jus 
primaevum’) each is free to everything against everyone (‘cuique licet omnia in omnes’). He 
stresses more strongly than Grotius did, the ‘right by which everyone has access to all means 
that he considers necessary to his conservation’. But, interestingly, Velthuysen does not 
follow Hobbes any further. Like Grotius he prepares the field for his critique of Socinian 
atonement by elaborating on the private-public distinction in establishing that punishment 
should agree with public well-being. On that basis, both Grotius and Velthuysen argue that 
indeed Christ must be said to have died for our sins, which as a matter of fact was denied by 
Socinus and Crellius.  
 
Here, in the process of an essentially theological debate the outlines of a political theory were 
developed, and the support of some Hobbesian positions was invoked. Like Grotius, 
Velthuysen did not escape the suspicion of supporting Socinianism by using bad arguments 
against it. No doubt, for all their novelty, these arguments must have been considered bad 
ones. Juridico-political arguments in a theological debate were anathema to the orthodox 
theologians anyhow. Since Velthuysen in this, his first book had begun to connect Hobbes 
with Grotius and hence with Remonstrantism and, being a Cartesian, with free thought as 
well, the ‘Scyllas and Charibdes that threaten the real Christian, the Cartesiana theologia and 
the Hobbesiana pietas’ had taken shape.27 The counter-Remonstrant suspicions about 
Cartesianism had been connected to the disrepute of Hobbes among their pietist brethren in 
England. As such it would acquire a momentum of its own, not to be checked by careful 
scrutiny of either Hobbes’s political theory or its (limited) use in what later would be known 
as Dutch republican political theory, let alone the combination of both. 
 
But as it was, Velthuysen had hit upon the basic principles of the political theory he was 
going to develop in more detail in his Dissertatio epistolica de principiis justi et decori of 
1651, which he was advised to publicise by adding to the title that it was meant as a defence 
of Hobbes’s De Cive. This was neither wise nor correct. I don’t agree with Noel Malcolm’s 
description of Velthuysen and the republicans of the 1660s and 1670s, De la Court and 
Spinoza, as Hobbesian-republicans. Malcolm seems to see our intellectual task as one of 
finding out how Dutch Hobbesians managed to develop Hobbes’s political theory into the 
basis of republicanism. As I will continue to argue, the matter is slightly different. It is rather 
the question why Dutch republicans did see no harm in considering Hobbes a useful addition 
to their argument. The short answer to this question naturally is that they understood Hobbes 
as a pupil of Grotius, and believed to have sufficiently harnessed their theories against 
Hobbesian positions they did not accept. Moreover, indeed, they understood Dutch politics as 
strongly different from that of other nations. Even absolutists like the later Grotius, and his 
pupil Dirk Graswinkel, pointed out that in a constitutional state like the Dutch, the magistrate 
                                                 
26 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, dedication: “Denique toto illo tempore, quo post peregrinationes meas 
familiaritas mihi tecum intercessit, tot tantaque effusa erga me benevolentiae testimonia edidisti.” 
27 These are the sarcastic words of an anonymous critic of Velthuysen in [Anonymus] 1666, Theologia. 
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was not ‘legibus solutus’. They could maintain this exceptional position because they 
believed that problems of morality were different from those of politics, as other republicans 
would argue more profusely. 
 
Let us pursue Lambertus van Velthuysen in his political use of the satisfactio Christi: 
In order to decide on the issue of the atonement, Velthuysen puts forward a version of 
Grotius’ theory of punishment. This theory is meant to show that punishment is not a pay-off 
or retribution by the transgressor of the damage done. Punishment aims at prevention, by 
setting examples and inculcating fear. Punishment is neither retribution nor an act of anger. Its 
final cause is obedience to the law, as is the purpose of the Gospel anyhow.  
 
Velthuysen is self-conscious about his adherence to a modern style of philosophy: ‘while 
abstaining from an appeal to whatever human authority, and freeing my mind of all 
prejudices, I go after the truth by way of first principles, whom no one in all sanity will 
oppose.’ 28 This process will lead to dogmata that can be accepted, or else: ‘suspendo 
judicium’. 
 
He starts off with what he considers to be the Sententia orthodoxorum, that God the Father, 
out of his immense mercy and love towards mankind, sent his only son into the world, who by 
his obedience, death, and other foregoing sufferings redeemed from eternal death mankind, 
who by and because of their sins is subject to eternal damnation, and thereby really satisfying 
their sins.29 This starting point is, as the first chapter of Grotius De satisfactione, about the 
prima facie meaning of Scripture, a meaning that has to be elucidated by further analysis. 
 
Then, he introduces a long quote from Martinus Ruarus, to present the Socinian position.30 
This is an interesting move, since he thereby continues not so much the Grotius-Crellius 
debate, but rather the discussion between Grotius and his Dutch correspondents among whom 
Ruarus was one. 31 The letter in question was not (yet) published, but ‘paucorum manibus 
versetur’. Ruarus argues that God’s ‘acceptatio’ has not occurred on the basis of some price or 
merit, but out of God’s love.32 The long passage ends with remarking that it would go against 
God’s justice to require of an innocent the punishment due to the culpable. And indeed, 
Velthuysen is going to structure his argument on the basis of this challenge: to safeguard the 
traditional and common-sense meaning of this central article of creed in the light of the 
rationalist considerations of the Socinians. Interestingly, he seems to accept a large part of 
Ruarus’ analysis – though without acknowledging so – as he concentrates on the last bit: the 
punishment of an innocent. Indeed, he sets off on a deeply philosophical adventure, to 
demonstrate that man cannot trade or contract with God; and that God’s transcendence 
implies a much more complicated relationship between God and His creation than either 
                                                 
28 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, dedication: “abdicata quorumlibet hominum authoritate, animoque omnibus 
praejudiciis ... denudato, mihi aditum ad veritatem faciam per prima principia, quorum nemo sanus probationem 
postulaverit.” 
29 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, 2: “Deum patrem, pro immensa sua misericordia, & amore erga genus humanum 
misisse in mundum filium suum unigenitum, qui homines per & propter peccata aeternae damnationi obnoxios, 
per obedientiam, mortem, & reliquas passiones, quae eam praecesse, vere pro eorum peccatis satisfaciendo, 
redimeret à perditione aeterna.” 
30 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, 3-5: “utar verbis Ruari cujusdam, viri inter adversarios imprimis docti, & magni 
nominis, qui in Epistola quadam familiari ad amicum, suam, & in ea communem Socianorum fidem super hoc 
articulo sic exponet.” 
31 Cf. Ruarus 1677, Martini. 
32 Ruarus 1677, Martini, p. __: “meritum stricte dictum satisfactione excludo ... non ex proportione operum, sed 
ex Dei, aut beneplacito, aut promisso mensuratum ... [and finally:] nec justitia Dei permittat, ut poena nocenti 
debita, innocenti irrogetur.” 
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Grotius, or the Counter-Remonstrants may have believed. Equally interesting, he integrates 
essential Grotian doctrine of natural law into his theology. It will be very helpful to our 
understanding of Grotius’ intervention in the Socinian debate to follow this further 
development. 
 
Essentially, that Velthuysen denies that God punishes the innocent, and at the same time 
proves that he still can uphold that justification is not a recompense for ‘fides & bona opera’. 
 
Velthuysen maintains that even while God is the highest authority and absolute ruler of the 
universe, nevertheless there is a ‘right by which to everyone belongs everything that he judges 
necessary to his existence; in such a way that although nobody lords over other people except 
by explicit or implicit pact, a ruler can nonetheless prescribe laws to the citizens and force 
them if they don’t obey’. (p. 9) This right of the ruler is the very same right of all men in the 
first of times, and the ruler acts similarly for the conservation of society as individual men for 
their own preservation. These natural rights in extreme cases justify war, although ‘non nisi 
extrema est necessitas. Et si in bellum erumpat contentio, ab utraque parte fit justum’ (p. 10). 
 
If indeed rule is based on contract, then God’s rule can be regarded as based on contract as 
well: even while God does not really contract with men, he grants men certain rights, because 
like other rulers, God wants men to obey out of their own free will. So God obtains men’s 
obedience by promises rather than punishment, ‘licet pactum fuerit gratuitum’ (pp. 13-4). 
Velthuysen wants us to distinguish between a privilege based on a contract, and hence a right 
that must be respected ‘justitiâ salvâ’, and a pure ‘liberalitas’ in which the subjects are no 
party. It is the former that wise rulers prefer. A similar argument applies to God’s norms of 
justice. God’s justice must be understandable by man: the norms of justice should be ‘ea ut 
justa, secundum certas regulas justitiae, quae inter homines in usu sunt, ab hominibus judicari 
possit: quorsum enim alioquin Deus toties ad suae justitiae contemplationem homines 
invitaret Ier 9:24. 2Chr. 19.v.7. & in aliis locis infinitis’. -18. We see Velthuysen here 
continuing the rationalist project Grotius presented in his De satisfactione: a strict parallelism 
between God as a ruler and human rulers, between God’s justice and human justice. 
 
Also, in respect to the concept of punishment, Velthuysen sides with the early Grotius. 
Punishment is not a ‘compensation of suffering’, as Crellius wants it. ‘The aim of punishment 
is not quite a recompense for the suffering received from the injustice, but a removal of future 
suffering. Such suffering would, however, follow previous injustice and the suffering 
following from that, if it were perpetrated unpunished’.33 This argument fits into the previous: 
only if the norms of justice are clear, can prevention have a chance of success. This also helps 
explain that punishment does not involve an element of joy (which it would have had, if it 
were a recompense for endured suffering). Punishment is a careful judgement of negative and 
positive utilities, considered from the perspective of the ‘pax & reipublicae incolumnitas’ (p. 
29). This, it is easily understood, that evil that does not noticeably damage the state can 
remain unpunished.34
 
Along these lines, Velthuysen further expounds the irrelevance to try to forbid what cannot 
depend on law, but only on the good will of the people (we don’t ask the merchants a promise 
                                                 
33 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, pp. 25-26: “Finem poenarum non esse proprie satisfactionem pro damno accepto 
per injuriam: sed propulsationem damni futuri: quod tamen ex priori injuria, & damno per eam accepto, si 
impune transmitteretur, ad nos rediret”. 
34 This evidently is one of the early formulations of the Dutch practice of ‘gedogen’ or permissiveness, like ‘no 
war on soft drugs, as that might lead to an akward repressive structure’. 
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never to cheat, p. 29). In this sense we should read the old saying: salutem reipublicae 
summam legem esse. (p. 30) Moreover, it is not ‘in debitum’ that we find the formal cause of 
punishment. Debit follows contract (or delictum), punishment is founded ‘in illo jure 
primaevo, quo cuique licet in proximum, quod sano judicio existimat conducere’ (p. 35). This 
is most evident in the fact that rulers also punish outside their own territory. This also coheres 
with the Scriptural admonishment that we should forgive our wrongdoers, because ‘if that is 
done what induces fear in men, the laws will be satisfied’.35 We do not punish because we 
want revenge, or want to see people suffer, ‘sed quia nos jus habemus nosmet conservandi’. 
(p. 45) 
 
In consecutive steps Velthuysen demonstrates that Christ’s satisfaction is independent from 
original sin, that punishment is also independent from the actual sinner, and that ultimately 
the very notion of justice is crucial to understand punishment. Like Grotius, Velthuysen 
deploys a humanist Christianity on its way to the Enlightenment: Christ’s redemption is not 
independent from man’s actions, but requires the establishment of justice on earth. A strong 
anti-Augustinian tendency united Grotius and Velthuysen, even if they both fall short of a 
perfectionist position like that of Dirk Coornhert. They have arrived at their position from the 
opposite end: by taking the challenge of reason of state serious. In Grotius this is represented 
in the crucial notion of ‘fides’, in Velthuysen it is the reliance on the right of self-defence. For 
Grotius fides is the fountain of morality. Velthuysen will attempt a derivation of benevolence 
from the love of self.36 Their realism in politics is always contained in a framework of 
justice.37
 
Grotius eventually will sharply distinguish God’s rule from that of man. As Creator of the 
World and dominus mundi God has absolute rule, whereas among men, where this dominium 
is absent, rule can only be based on contract. God’s rule is evident from the decrees he has 
issued. These decrees are freely declared. Contract is a set of mutual obligations, which can 
exist among men, but not between man and God. We cannot contract with God since, even 
where the Scripture speaks of contract, it must be understood as a free and arbitrary gift by 
God. 
 
The central distinction for both Grotius and Velthuysen is the one between contractual 
relations on the one hand, and the function of law on the other. Contracts define mutual 
obligations, the mine and thine in social relations. Here the relationship is one of creditor and 
debtor. And while the ‘neminem laedere’ and the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ are the basic 
principles of contractual relations, even while necessity and self-preservation may sometimes 
lead to conflicting outcomes, punishment is not and cannot be part of contract. 
 
                                                 
35 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, p. 40: “si itaque id praestetur, quo hominibus terror incutitur, legibus satisfactum 
est”. p. 40. 
36 See Blom 1995, Causality, chapters 4 and 5. Essentially, Velthuysen wil argue that the efficient cause of 
benevolence is ‘the law of self-preservation’, while the efficient cause of property is benevolence, i.e. an other-
regarding attitude (the latter holds, because property is always the recognition of others’ rights). 
37 Velthuysen, e.g. argues, that when a state necessitate coacta starts a war against another country, propter 
rerum necessariarum pernuriam outside the control of this other country, then this war even if ab utraque parte 
justum, cannot be called a punishment, not because the other country has not acted against us or didn’t hurt our 
rights, but because the formal reason of punishment is absent; i.e. the application of harm after a harm has been 
done to our socciety that, if unpunished, will produce further harm. Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, p. 47: “non 
vocatur vindicta, neque poena; non ideo, quia illa societas, quam armis aggredimur, nihil in nos commissit, aut 
jus non violavit: sed quia deest formalis ratio poenae, quae est inflictio mali propter malum, quo laesa est 
societas, quod malum sua natura aptum est, ni vindicetur, post se trahere aliud malum”. 
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Matters are different from the perspective of law: the intention of law is obedience. This 
obedience – as Velthuysen stresses time and again – is best obtained if performed voluntarily. 
Nevertheless, the magistrate has to employ means to secure obedience. Punishment is the 
instrument to obtain obedience in the future. In an interesting evocation of De jure belli ac 
pacis, Velthuysen argues that it is not the contract that produces the grounds for obedience, 
but the intention of the lawgiver to have the laws obeyed. The only reason, he says – 
repeating Grotius’ argument in De satisfactione – that a transgression of laws by people living 
in other countries is not generally punished by the magistrates, is to be found in the fact that 
these transgressions do not normally harm the interests of the magistrates’ own country. But if 
they do, then there is a just cause for war. 
 
By this distinction between private, contractual relations and public law, Velthuysen enhances 
his definition of punishment as an instrument to ensure future obedience to the law and 
thereby to promote the end of laws themselves, the salus populi. Thus the magistrates may 
very well exempt a wrong-doer from punishment, or even punish innocent people, as e.g. they 
might punish a son for what his father did. The public well-being may dictate so. The same 
goes for just war: here many innocent people are punished (in passing, Velthuysen denies the 
notion of a collective responsibility of a people for their magistrates’ wrongs). War indeed is a 
deterrent rather than a retribution, and even where presented as a retribution it really is a 
deterrent. 
 
By stressing the interdependence of law enforcement and a self-reliant social morality, we can 
better understand the contractual origins of the state. The state is not a precondition for moral 
norms in society, but rather the precondition for the private-public distinction. As Velthuysen 
already had pointed out in 1648: the political contract is something ‘naturae superveniens’, 
and its purpose is to give the magistrate the monopoly of punishment, on the basis of which 
the magistrate proclaims laws. Since the pristine right to punish looked at self-preservation, 
the laws should look at the conservation and the salus populi of the community. There are 
many things, however, that a magistrate should not prescribe. They might, in one of 
Velthuysen’s examples, consider to require from merchants a solemn pledge that they will 
never give underweight, as if by bringing in the force of religion many evils might be 
prevented. But the magistrate should realise that the commonwealth does not require at all 
such a constriction of conscience. It will simply not be an expedient thing to do. 
 
In this attempt to integrate the different theories of punishment in De satisfactione and 
DJB&P, Velthuysen directs the attention to one of the main reasons that Grotius may have 
had at changing his perspective from the former to the latter book. In De satisfactione he had 
reached the limits of his rationalist theology. Pursuing that line would have forced him either 
to accept a naturalist position (which is that of Velthuysen) or a theocratic one. The solution 
he chose was to separate God’s justice from that of man. This allowed him to make justice the 
business of all, even if this meant a loss of certainty in the application of punishment. 
However, it implied at the same time a great opportunity for the truth of justice, resulting 
from the social process of justification that goes with it. 
 
Van den Wijnpersse and his friends in the Haagsche Genootschap were remarkably 
favourable of Grotius. They accepted his conception of the redemption through Christ, as 
much as they knew him as the father of modern natural law. They may have just noticed the 
inconsistency between the two theories of punishment, but they were unaware of the 
difficulties that had marked Grotius’ quest for a satisfactory theory of sociability. In their 
time, religion and natural law had long ended their disputes. 
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Looking for the place of the Socinian theme in the writings of Hugo Grotius, we combined 
two research strategies: the theological and the juridico-political lines. We showed how 
Grotius developed his ideas on punishment and at the same time further detailed his ideas 
about God’s command of the world. From the Aristotelian position in De aequitate, to that in 
DJP and from there onwards to De satisfactione and DJB&P, a natural connection between 
offence and punishment is left behind, and is replaced by the punishing rector of society first, 
and the punishing righteous individuals later on. The implied continuity between God-Rector 
and magistrate-rector makes for a continuity between godly and worldly justice, or rather, 
seems to organise God’s rectorial punishment according to human conceptions. So Grotius 
was happy to argue reasonably against Socinus’ idea that the whole idea of Christ suffering to 
satisfy for our sins is against reason: as a wise Rector He has both accepted Christ’s 
satisfaction and dispensated the believers from the punishment by eternal death, precisely 
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